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We conjecture that individual purchases of counterfeit products could be motivated by 
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1. Introduction 
 
Fake, counterfeit, imitation, illicit or pirated goods, these are all products or goods 
that are associated with original goods being copied without the authorisation of the 
owner of the intellectual property. With intellectual property we mean copyrights and 
related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, patens, lay-out designs of 
integrated circuits, and undisclosed information (see WTO 2012). These un-original 
products are packaged identically to the originals, as a means to obtain financial 
benefit (see OECD 2007a). 
 The people and organisations who produce and distribute counterfeit and 
pirated goods are interested in those types of goods which produce high profit 
margins (in profitable markets), with low or at least acceptable risks. If the potential 
benefits to produce and distribute the counterfeit or pirated goods exceed the potential 
risks of detection and the potential penalties, the counterfeiters and/or pirates will 
produce and distribute these illicit goods (see OECD 2007b). 
 
Some figures 
Research done on the responsibility of the secretary-general of the OECD, 
documented in the report “The economic impact of counterfeiting and piracy” (see 
OECD 2007b) has shown that virtually every economy has to deal with counterfeit 
and/or pirated products, either in terms of the production or the distribution of these 
goods. Furthermore, it is reported that the impact of the production and distribution of 
counterfeit and pirated goods tends to be larger in developing countries than in 
developed countries. OECD (2007b) suggests that Asia is the largest source for 
counterfeit and pirated goods, with China as the single largest source economy. This 
finding is confirmed by data of the International Anti Counterfeiting Coalition Inc. 
(IACC), a non-profit organisation in the United States of America, which is devoted 
solely to combating product counterfeiting and piracy (see IAAC 2011).  
 Over the years, almost every type of good has been counterfeited and/or 
pirated, and the numbers are believed to increase, (see OECD 2007b, Dixon and 
Greenhalgh 2002). Analysis carried out by the OECD in 2005 has led to believe that 
the international trade in counterfeit and pirated products made up for USD 200 
Billion of the total international trade. In the OECD’s 2007 report on this matter it is 
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emphasized that this above-mentioned estimate, which exceeds the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of about 150 economies around the world, might be several hundred 
billion dollars less than the real figure, given that it is impossible to detect all of the 
goods that are the product of counterfeiting and piracy. Moreover, the figure excludes 
counterfeit and pirated goods that are produced and distributed domestically or via the 
internet. 
 More recent estimates of the economic impact of counterfeit and pirated goods 
were made by the Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP). 
BASCAP, which was initiated by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
based their estimates on the figures published by the OECD in their report which was 
issued in 2008. BASCAP summed the OECD’s (estimated) figures regarding 
international and domestic trade in counterfeits and pirated goods including digital 
piracy. BASCAP’s (2011) total estimated amount for the trade in counterfeit and 
pirated goods for 2008, ranged between USD 455 Billion and USD 650 Billion. This 
estimated amount is expected to range between USD 1220 Billion and USD 1770 
Billion by 2015. 
 It is not only the international trade that has suffered from the impact of 
counterfeit and piracy activities. The OECD concludes in 2007 that national 
economies, of developing as well as of developed countries, have suffered from the 
effects of these unlawful acts as well. Developing countries are found to have suffered 
more, due in part to the relatively weak enforcement in most of these developing 
countries.  Furthermore, the increase of criminal activities, including tax evasion, the 
loss of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the issues around employment, 
environment and economic growth, are reported as the main negative effects of 
counterfeiting and piracy on national economies. The OECD also identifies that the 
owners of the intellectual property and the (deceived) consumers of counterfeit and 
pirated goods are the victims of the illegal activities of counterfeiters and pirates. 
Moreover, the consumers of counterfeit and pirated goods suffer from lower 
consumer utility and potentially from health and safety risks (see Dixon and 
Greenhalgh, 2002, Scorpecci 2009). 
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Our study 
One particular motivation for consumers to consciously purchase counterfeit products, 
which is usually considered as the dominant motivation, is the income level of the 
consumers. Indeed, counterfeit products may be cheaper and hence lower-income 
households, or people in lower-income (developing) countries, might be more prone 
to purchasing such counterfeits. In the present paper we challenge this dominant 
conjecture by putting forward another motivation, which has to do with cultural 
norms and values. Such norms have been seen to be relevant in other situations 
concerning illegal activities, see Fisman and Miguel (2007), and perhaps they are of 
relevance here too. To empirically examine this possibility, we collect detailed survey 
data on three groups of individuals which in various dimensions should be similar 
while in others are very dissimilar. In short, we interview Surinamese individuals in 
Suriname (a developing country), Surinamese individuals in the Netherlands (an 
OECD country) and Dutch individuals in the Netherlands. Our main focus will be on 
the similarities and differences across these three groups, where the first two would be 
more similar in terms of cultural norms and values, whereas the last two groups would 
be more similar in terms of income.  
Our key finding is that even though income levels are about 10 times as high 
in the Netherlands than in Suriname, the preferences for counterfeit products are 
about twice as high for Surinamese individuals, also when it concerns Surinamese 
individuals living in the Netherlands.  
 The outline of our paper is as follows. First, we discuss some aspects of the 
relevant literature on the consumer motivations to purchase counterfeit products. 
Next, we discuss the data collection and the survey questions that we used. Then we 
turn to the results, where we analyze similarities and differences across the three 
groups of individuals. We conclude with a discussion and the main implications from 
our study.  
  
 
2. Background and hypothesis 
 
With an increase in global trade, currently involving almost all countries in the world, 
interest is growing in studying various aspects of trade in counterfeit products.  
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Motivations for consumers to purchase counterfeit products is receiving attention, in 
particular when they are aware that the products are indeed counterfeits, see Bian and 
Moutinho (2009), Tom et al. (1998) and Wilcox, Kim, and Sen (2009). Interestingly, 
these studies all concern consumers in western countries (most notably the USA), and 
as such these studies address only one part of the story.  
 A commonly appreciated and accepted motivation for consciously purchasing 
counterfeit products is income or price. The price of the original product can be much 
higher than that of a counterfeit, while the difference in quality might be perceived as 
not that large. When prices are perceived as higher, then certainly lower-income 
households will be more inclined to purchase fake products. This behaviour may 
concern luxury goods (think of top brand fashion bags, sunglasses or watches), but 
also medication (like aspirins and anti-depressiveness medicines). The consumption 
of counterfeits might therefore be higher in developing countries, relative to 
developed countries, as the first countries have more households with low incomes. 
Indeed, in 2010 the World Health organization estimated that up to 10% of medicines 
are likely to be counterfeited, whereas in some developing countries this number 
might even close to one third.   
 There are not many studies on the drivers of the consumption of counterfeit 
products. And, when there are studies, they typically cover developed countries, with 
a few exceptions. Wee et al. (1995) and Kwong et al. (2003) document that there is 
apparently no (self-stated) relation between purchase intention and income. In 
contrast, Ang et al. (1999) and Tom et al. (1998) report that lower income levels do 
make people to have a more positive attitude towards counterfeit production and 
sales, in general. Furthermore, Albert-Miller (1998) and Tom et al. (1998) do report 
an effect of price on the intent to purchase counterfeit products 
 
Could cultural norms matter too? 
In sum, there seems to be consensus, and admittedly the consensus does have clear 
face value, that price of the original products versus the fake products and the 
individual income level can be drivers of counterfeit purchases and purchase intents. 
In the present paper we wish to examine if there is a potential other driver and this 
concerns cultural norms. Our conjecture is based on the innovative and interesting 
outcomes reported in Fisman and Miguel (2007), where it turned out those responses 
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to changes in policy concerning potential illegal activities differed across nationalities 
and cultures. In terms of our study, we wonder whether it could be that appreciation 
and adoption of counterfeit products is in part also governed by cultural norms. That 
cultural norms could make a distinction concerning counterfeits has also been 
documented in Vittel (2003) and Harvey and Walls (2003), comparing different 
countries.  
 To be able to study this possibility we need to discern groups of individuals 
which might share cultural norms but who differ in their income levels and perceived 
price levels. We believe we have found such a situation for the people who live in the 
South American country of Suriname and the Surinamese individuals who live in the 
Netherlands. We will examine to what extent these two groups share values and 
norms, and we compare their income levels and ask for their appreciation and 
adoption of counterfeit products.   
 
 
3. Data collection 
 
We collected our data in Suriname, a South-American country with a developing 
economy, and in the Netherlands, a member state of the European Union (EU) with a 
developed economy. Suriname borders with Guyana in the west, French Guyana in 
the east, and Brazil in the south. The Caribbean islands are located north of the 
country. The Netherlands is in Western Europe, north of Belgium and west of 
Germany.  
 
The countries  
According to the most recent estimate (2010) of the General Bureau of Statistics of 
Suriname (GBS), Suriname had a population of 531,170 inhabitants. In addition, GBS 
estimated that the majority of the population (88.5%) was younger than 59 years, with 
generally slightly more males than females. The Surinamese population has a rich 
diversity of ethnic groups, and thereby Suriname has a rich cultural diversity. As 
stated by Economy Watch in 2010, 2010 Suriname had a GDP Per Capita (PPP in 
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USD) of 8,924.20 USD. Compared to other countries, Suriname ranked 87th in the 
world rankings according to GDP Per Capita (PPP). 
 Statistics Netherlands (CBS, 2011) reported 16.7 million inhabitants for this 
country, of which the majority (84.7%) was younger than 65 years.  The Netherlands 
is inhibited by slightly more women than men. In addition, CBS noted a number of 
about 1.9 million inhabitants (11%) of non-western origin, of which 342,000 (18%) 
are Dutch inhabitants of Surinamese origin of various ethnicities. Given that Suriname 
and the Netherlands share the same official language (Dutch), most overseas 
Surinamese do live in the Netherlands, which makes that approximately 40% of 
Suriname individuals worldwide live in the Netherlands, and about 60% live in 
Suriname. According to Economy Watch in 2010 the Netherlands had a GDP Per 
Capita (PPP) of 40,764.55 USD ranking this country on the 10th place in their world 
rankings. 
 
History 
Suriname and the Netherlands have a relationship that dates back to shortly before the 
year 1667, when the Dutch traded New Amsterdam, nowadays New York, for 
Suriname, with the British. This meant that Suriname came formally under Dutch 
ruling, after being a British settlement for several years.  Suriname remained a colony 
of the Netherlands until November 25, 1975.  
Around 1975 there were several developments that stood at the beginning of 
the current situation with many Surinamese living in the Netherlands. There was 
unrest amongst parties which were in favour of independence and those which 
opposed it. Around that time, the economic situation in Suriname deteriorated, and 
together with uncertainty about the future development of the country, large parts of 
the Surinamese population emigrated, in particular to the Netherlands, briefly before 
and around the time the independence became a fact in 1975, see Choenni and 
Harmsen (2007) and Nicholaas and Sprangers (2007).   
According to Nicholaas and Sprangers (2007) there was another influx of 
Surinamese people to the Netherlands in the years 1979 and 1980, as a result of the 
so-called “Toescheidingsovereenkomst” between the Netherlands and Suriname. This 
agreement offered Surinamese the opportunity to choose the Dutch nationality up to 
five years after the independence of Suriname. Choenni and Harmsen (2007) also 
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report that a significant number of Surinamese inhabitants migrated to the 
Netherlands in the early 1990’s. This was possibly influenced by the then poor 
economic situation in Suriname. The Netherlands has always been the preferred 
option for emigration. 
Even though the people of Surinamese origin (with Dutch passports) generally 
are rather well assimilated within in the Dutch society, most of them still retain a 
strong relationship with the country of origin and their family members who still live 
in Suriname. Statistics of the Surinamese Ministry of Transportation, 
Communications and Tourism showed that in 2008 approximately 64% of all visitors 
(137,421) to this country came from the Netherlands. Given the fact that a large 
portion of the Dutch people of Surinamese origin still retains a relationship with this 
country, it is likely that the majority of the Dutch visitors may be of Surinamese 
origin. In addition, in 2009 the CBS investigated the foreign money transfers from the 
four largest ethnic groups (associated with Suriname) in the Netherlands, and they 
found that in 2006 nearly a quarter of immigrant households said to have transferred 
money abroad, especially to parents, relatives or friends. The year average was 165.00 
Euro (approximately 215.84 USD) per household. The highest proportion, namely 
more than 35 percent, is found to be among Dutch people from Surinamese origin. In 
addition, the report showed that in 2006 this group also had the highest year average 
of the amount of money transferred, namely 225.00 Euro (approximately 294.33 
USD) per household.  
 
Data collection by surveys 
We collected data using basic survey techniques. We asked the same questions to 
three groups of individuals. For the sake of notation and discussion we abbreviate 
these groups as Surinamese individuals in Suriname (A), Surinamese individuals in 
the Netherlands (B) and Dutch individuals in the Netherlands (C). Data on A and B 
were collected by us personally (with the help of a few assistants), while data on C 
were collected by a professional marketing research agency.  
 The 225 individuals in Suriname were contacted (in the spring of 2011) by 
two of our assistants, who approached respondents in person at school, at work, and 
while participating in social activities, asking them to participate in the survey.  
Convenience sampling was used to select the respondents, although it was made sure 
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that (approximately) a reasonable reflection of general demographics could be found 
amongst the 225 individuals. Data collection took about two months.  
The Netherlands-based individuals of Surinamese origin (B, with 108 
individuals) were contacted by email by the second author in the fall of 2010.  These 
individuals were alerted to a web-based survey. The second author is familiar with the 
Surinamese community in the Netherlands, and as such could make sure that there 
would be diversity across the respondents (in terms of ethnicity and income levels). 
The collection of this sample was rather time-consuming (two months), and hence we 
managed to collect data only for 108 individuals. Below we will learn that despite this 
somewhat smaller sample, the results appear to be quite conclusive.  
Finally, the control group (C) containing the Dutch individuals in the 
Netherlands were contacted by a professional marketing research bureau in the fall of 
2011. This company collected data until they had a response of 200 individuals. 
Based on their data files, this company could filter out Surinamese individuals from 
their records, and so they could make sure that all 200 respondents are born and raised 
Dutch individuals. So, Dutch citizens with a Moroccan or Turkish background were 
not included.   
The three groups (A, B and C) received the same questionnaires (expect for 
some questions about ethnicity to group C), and this allows us to compare the answers 
across the groups.  
 An important component of our survey concerns the norms and values of the 
individuals in the three groups. Fritzsche and Oz (2007) observe that even though 
there are different wordings used to define these terms, various definitions generally 
lead to the observation that values affect behaviour. Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach 
(1989) define a value as “an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-
state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode 
of conduct or end state of existence". In order to disclose more about individuals’ 
values, Rokeach designed the so-called “Rokeach Value Survey” (RVS). The RVS 
appears to be the most frequently used instrument for measuring human values.  The 
RVS consists of concepts of the most desirable values that are rank-ordered in terms 
of their importance as guiding principles in a personal life, see Rokeach and Ball-
Rokeach (1989) and Kamakura and Mazzon (1991), amongst others. 
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 In the Appendix in Table A1 below we give the relevant items that we also 
used to assess and to score the norms and values of the individuals in our three groups 
of interest.  
In the same Appendix in Tables A2 and A3 we present our own questions 
about the values concerning counterfeit products relative to original products (A2) 
and the values concerning the production and sales of counterfeits (A3). We will use 
the scores on these questions to compare the individuals in the three respondent 
groups.  
 
 
4. Results 
 
In this section we present the results of the extensive surveys held amongst the three 
groups and we compare the scores on norms and values, on demographics and on 
actual behaviour regarding counterfeit products. We then discuss income levels in the 
three surveys, and we end with a set of questions regarding the prices of counterfeit 
products relative to original products. 
 
Norms and values  
Table 1 shows the mean scores of questions on norms and values. The numbers in 
parentheses are the numbers of respondents who actually responded. In general the 
scores of individuals in group C are lower than those of group A and B.  
 When we compare the two groups with Surinamese individuals (A and B) we 
see that for 15 out of 18 values, the results are broadly similar. Only for the general 
values G9 (National safety), G12 (Forgiveness) and G16 (Achievements), we see that 
there are some differences with the Surinamese living the Netherlands quoting lower 
scores. When we compare the control group C with A and B, we see that the Dutch in 
the Netherlands seems to have lower average scores than Surinamese individuals on 
G4 (World peace), G5 (Equal human rights), G6 (Wisdom and knowledge), and also 
on G12 and G16.  
  Table 2 presents the mean scores of the differences across the scores in the 
columns of Table 1. On average the differences between Surinamese individuals in 
Suriname and in the Netherlands (A versus B) is 0.083, while the differences between 
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Surinamese people in Suriname and Dutch individuals in the Netherlands (A versus 
C) is 0.406. Hence, Table 2 shows that, in terms of general values, the Surinamese in 
Suriname and the Surinamese in the Netherlands are very similar as they closely share 
their norms and values.  
 Tables 3 and 4 are in the same format as Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Table 3 
shows the mean scores on the statements in Table A2 associating with norms and 
values concerning counterfeit products in general and relative to original products. It 
is interesting to see that there seems to be agreement amongst the Surinamese (A and 
B) on all values except for C2 (“for higher quality products one does not always have 
to spend more money”) and C6 (“If there would not be any counterfeit products, then 
many people could not purchase any products”). For group C we obtain yet another 
(higher) average value for C6, and also for C5 (“I usually purchase original products, 
even when the price of a counterfeit product is lower”), in which case the Dutch in the 
Netherlands agree more.  
 Table 4 presents the mean scores of the differences across the scores in the 
columns of Table 3. On average the differences between Surinamese individuals in 
Suriname and in the Netherlands is 0.167, while the differences between Surinamese 
people in the Netherlands and Dutch individuals in the Netherlands is 0.198. In 
contrast, the average difference in norms and values (concerning counterfeits) 
between Surinamese individuals in Suriname and Dutch people in the Netherlands is 
0.365. When we take in minimum and maximum values as well as the standard 
deviation into account, then we see that the distribution of the differences between 
Surinamese people in Suriname and in the Netherlands is much more peaked. In sum 
we conclude that the last two sets of individuals (B and C) have most similar norms 
and values concerning counterfeit products than across A and C. Note that the 
individuals in B and C are all living in the Netherlands.  
 Tables 5 and 6 present similar scores as Tables 3 and 4, where now the 
statements concern the norms and values relative to the production and sales of 
counterfeit products. Individuals in groups A and B seem to give broadly similar 
answers, except for P11 (“Producers of original products ask too much money for 
their products”), with which Surinamese in Suriname agree much more. Questions P3, 
P4 and P7 seem to receive different scores in group C, relative to A and B. When we 
look at Table 6, we get the same qualitative outcomes as in Table 2, which is that 
people in groups A and B are broadly similar in terms of norms and values.   
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Demographics 
Table 7 gives some summary statistics of the demographics. The main differences are 
the age distribution where Surinamese individuals in the Netherlands are much older 
on average than in Suriname, which corresponds with the fact that Suriname has a 
substantial amount of young citizens. Our sample in Suriname has a smaller fraction 
of Creoles and a larger fraction of mixed ethnicity. Furthermore, households in 
Suriname are substantially larger than in the Netherlands, where the Surinamese in the 
Netherlands have household sizes that come close to those of ethnic Dutch in the 
Netherlands.  
 The gender quotas amongst the Surinamese respondents (groups A and B) are 
a bit biased towards females, but this also indicates that the professional bureau that 
interviewed people in group C is of good quality (with 54% males).  There are more 
creoles interviewed in group B relative to A and less people with mixed ethnicity.  
 When we further compare the columns with headers B and C, we see that 
various scores are rather similar across Surinamese individuals in the Netherlands and 
Dutch people in the Netherlands. The distributions of the number of adults in a 
household, the number of children in a household and the number of working adults 
in a household are broadly similar across the two samples. Also, the age distribution is 
rather similar, and all this suggests that Surinamese people in the Netherlands have 
similar demographics as Dutch people in the Netherlands have. These statistics seem 
to confirm the earlier statements that the Surinamese in the Netherlands did assimilate 
rather well since 1975-1980.  
 
Purchases of counterfeits 
A key table in our paper is Table 8. It shows the fractions of individuals who state that 
they have recently and consciously purchased a counterfeit product. Interestingly, the 
percentages 83.7% and 77.4% for Surinamese people in Suriname and in the 
Netherlands (A and B), respectively, are about the same. In striking contrast is the 
50% score of Dutch people in the Netherlands.  
 Evaluating these scores against the impression we obtained from Tables 1 to 6, 
we are tempted to conclude that the similarity across norms and values for individuals 
in groups A and B also translates to actual behaviour. The Surinamese individuals 
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share the same norms and values and they also purchase counterfeit products with the 
same frequencies.  
To first examine the effect of income, we fit probit models to the purchase 
data for individuals to see if there are any variables that can predict this binary 
variable. Table 9 reports on the probit models (1 = yes, I purchased a counterfeit 
product recently, and 0 = no, I did not). The models include the average scores on 
norms and values (from Tables 1, 3 and 5) and the demographics from Tables 2 and 
10 (to be discussed below). In the models for Surinamese people we include variables 
for ethnicity, and in the model for Surinamese in the Netherlands we add the number 
of years that people are in the Netherlands. In the model for Dutch people in the 
Netherlands we do not include these variables as we have no data on these. The p-
values indicate the relevance of various sets of variables. All these p-values are way 
above 0.05, and hence suggest that the probability of purchasing counterfeit products 
does not depend on demographics, values, ethnic background, and not on how long 
people have already lived in the Netherlands. Hence, from Table 9 we can learn that 
income seems not to be a predictor for purchasing counterfeits.  
  
Is there a relation with income levels? 
When we continue with a focus on the income levels across the three groups, Table 10 
shows that the income distribution in Suriname is skewed to the left, with a large 
fraction of individuals that has less than 800 SRD (net) to spend per month, which is 
less than about 200 Euro per month. The income distribution for the Dutch in the 
Netherlands reflects that of the general Dutch population, with an average annual 
income of 30000 Euro (http://www.gemiddeld-inkomen.nl/modaal-inkomen.php), and 
as discussed before. Also, we notice a striking 17.5% of survey participants who 
refuse to indicate their income level.  
Interestingly, our survey amongst Surinamese people in the Netherlands (B) 
shows that their income levels are rather high, also when compared to the Dutch in the 
same country. This might be due to some sample selection (when collecting our data 
for group B), where we had to rely on friends and relatives (of the second author) to 
collect the addresses of Surinamese people in the Netherlands. This may have led to 
an underreporting for poor Surinamese in the Netherlands. Note however, that even 
when the Surinamese have approximately 12 times as much to spend (in terms of after 
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tax Euro), they still agree with more than 77% that they consciously purchase 
counterfeit products.  
 Figures 1 and 2 are based on data from the World Bank, and there it can be 
seen that in terms of real GDP per capita in USD terms, the fraction is about 10. 
Hence, the income levels in our sample B are a bit too high, but not too far out from 
average officially published levels.  
As a further comparison of income levels of the two groups of individuals, we 
can rely on the so-called Big Max index (not the menu, just the burger). In Suriname a 
Big Mac (September 2011) costs 11 SRD, which with an exchange rate (September 
2011) of 4.45 SRD per Euro amounts to approximately 2.5 Euro. In the Netherlands 
(again September 2011) the price of a Big Mac is 3.25 Euro. This shows that the price 
levels in Suriname are also relatively higher. 
 In sum, we can conclude that Surinamese individuals in Suriname have 
significantly less money to spend (also in terms of PPP) than Surinamese people in 
the Netherlands, and also than Dutch people in the Netherlands. 
 However, the fact that Surinamese individuals in the Netherlands have more 
than 10 times as much to spend does not have an impact on their propensity to 
purchase counterfeit products. The percentages in Table 8, that is, 83.7% and 77.4%, 
show that income apparently is not the key driver of purchasing counterfeit products. 
As we have seen from Tables 1 to 6, the norms and values of Surinamese people in 
Suriname and in the Netherlands are very similar, and quite different in various 
dimensions from those of Dutch people in the Netherlands, we are now tempted to 
conclude that norms and values might be a more important driver to purchase 
counterfeits. Surinamese people, whether rich or poor, apparently do not see any 
problems with purchasing counterfeits.  
 
Is there a relation with price levels? 
Finally, we also asked the individuals in the three samples whether the price of the 
products would induce a higher personal probability of purchasing counterfeit 
products. We mentioned 20 different types of products, and asked whether people 
would consider purchasing counterfeit versions of these products, given the price. 
Table 11 gives the total scores of disagree and of agree, and hence omits the 
indifferent category. We see that there can be differences across those percentages, 
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but also many similarities can be observed. Surinamese people disagree with the 
statements, on average, with fraction 58.25% and 55.71%, respectively, while the 
Dutch in the Netherlands disagree with 46.43%. On the other hand, the agree fractions 
of 21.31%, 24.00% and 21.73% for the three samples are broadly similar.  
 Tables 12 and 13 support these similarities even more, by showing that the 
mean differences in “Agree” (bottom panel of Table 12) are small, while the 
differences in “Disagree” are substantially larger. The correlations in Table 13 further 
show that there is strong correlation across the 20 types of products,  meaning that 
most interviewed individuals would consider similar products when purchasing 
counterfeit versions. We interpret the results in Table 11 to 13 as that the price levels 
of counterfeit products are not a driver either.  
  
 
5. Conclusions and implications 
 
In this final section we give the main conclusions of our study. Next, we discuss 
potential implications. Finally, we give suggestions for further research. 
 
Conclusion 
The population of Surinamese individuals, who live either in Suriname or in the 
Netherlands, provides a unique opportunity to test whether cultural norms and values 
could be one of the drivers of counterfeit purchases. We surveyed Surinamese people 
in both countries and held their answers to a range of questions against a control 
group of Dutch individuals in the Netherlands. We showed that Surinamese people in 
the Netherlands have assimilated rather well in the Netherlands, with similar sized 
families, similar age distributions, and, most importantly, similar disposable income 
levels. At the same time, their norms and values are broadly the same as the people in 
Suriname itself. And, saliently, their attitudes towards purchasing counterfeit products 
and even their factual purchasing behaviour are also broadly similar. This leads us to 
include that purchasing counterfeit products seems to be associated more with cultural 
norms than with income levels and prices.  
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Implications 
This conclusion has various implications. When international organisations intend to 
reduce the traffic and trade of illegal counterfeits, there seems more to be done than 
just equalising prices of products and to try to raise income standards in developing 
countries. Apparently, cultural aspects are important too, and campaigns to create 
awareness seem useful. This also suggests that the time we need to incorporate to 
make the current practice to change may perhaps take much longer than expected. 
Indeed, to change norms and values is much more time consuming than trying to 
change prices. 
 
Further research 
The collection of the relevant data is quite involved, and needs quite some attention 
from the researchers. As we are personally familiar with people in Suriname and the 
Netherlands, our choice for these two countries originated out of convenience. Further 
work in this area could address other large groups of individuals who live in their 
home country and somewhere abroad (in reasonably large amounts, so that cultural 
norms and values are kept as if they would still leave in the home country). One could 
think of Chinese people living in Australia or Turkish people living in Berlin.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1: General values  
(1 = very much disagree and 7 = very much agree) 
 
 
G1: Being happy with my life    
G2: True friendship   
G3: Self respect    
G4: World Peace    
G5: Equal human rights   
G6: Wisdom and knowledge (to make the proper decisions in life)   
G7: A comfortable life   
G8: Having fun     
G9: National safety   
G10: Freedom and independence (being able to make my own decisions)  
G11: Being appreciated by society at large   
G12: Forgiveness (to give or to be given)    
G13: Exciting life    
G14: Inner peace    
G15: A beautiful world    
G16: Achievements (working hard to reach the top)   
G17: True love    
G18: Safety for family   
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Table A2: Values concerning counterfeit products relative to original products  
(1 = very much disagree and 7 = very much agree) 
 
 
C1: “More expensive products are usually of better quality” 
C2: “For higher quality products one does not always have to spend more money” 
C3: “I usually purchase original products and the price is usually irrelevant” 
C4: “The price of a product is a good indicator of quality” 
C5: “I usually purchase original products, even when the price of a counterfeit 
product is lower” 
C6: “If there would not be any counterfeit products, then many people could not 
purchase any products” 
C7: “My friends and relatives support my purchasing of counterfeit products” 
C8: “My friends and relatives also purchase counterfeit products” 
C9: “Before I purchase a product, I compare the original with a counterfeit” 
C10: “I do not object that people purchase counterfeit products”  
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Table A3: Values concerning production and sales of counterfeits  
(1 = very much disagree and 7 = very much agree) 
 
 
P1: “Producing and selling counterfeit products is against the law” 
P2: “Governments should act strongly to prevent the production and sales of 
counterfeit products” 
P3: “It is mainly small firms that suffer most from the production and sales of 
counterfeit products” 
P4: “There is nothing wrong with the production and sales of counterfeit products” 
P5: “People who purchase counterfeit products act against the law” 
P6: “There is nothing wrong with purchasing counterfeit products” 
P7: “Counterfeit products are often cheaper than original products” 
P8: “Counterfeit products are of the same quality as original products” 
P9: “If people purchase counterfeit products, then this will harm all firms which 
make original products” 
P10: “Counterfeit products can be unsafe and unhealthy” 
P11: “Producers of original products ask too much money for their products” 
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Table 1: mean scores (with number of respondents in parentheses) for general 
values (Table A1) 
 
 
    Surinamese  Surinamese  Dutch (200) 
Values   in Suriname  in the Netherlands in the Netherlands 
     
       
G1   6.66 (224)  6.73 (108)  6.43 
G2   6.29 (225)  6.44 (108)  6.05 
G3   6.71 (223)  6.71 (107)  6.16 
G4   6.34 (224)  6.21 (108)  5.76 
G5   6.50 (220)  6.43 (107)  5.89 
G6   6.53 (222)  6.39 (108)  5.90 
G7   6.08 (225)  6.09 (108)  5.94 
G8   5.98 (222)  6.33 (107)  6.14 
G9   6.60 (224)  6.18 (108)  5.91 
G10   6.33 (225)  6.47 (108)  6.23 
G11   5.91 (222)  5.90 (108)  5.54 
G12   6.20 (225)  5.82 (106)  5.48 
G13   5.24 (221)  5.02 (106)  4.89 
G14   6.61 (225)  6.63 (106)  6.24 
G15   5.36 (225)  5.58 (106)  5.69 
G16   6.29 (225)  5.49 (108)  4.61 
G17   6.28 (223)  6.11 (107)  6.12 
G18   6.74 (224)  6.63 (108)  6.37 
 
Average   6.37 (201)  6.17 (103)  5.85 
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Table 2: Differences in general values (Table A1) 
 
 
People versus people    Mean Median Min. Max. SD 
 
 
Surinamese in Suriname   0.083 0.04 -0.35 0.80 0.264 
- Surinamese in the Netherlands 
 
Surinamese in the Netherlands   0.323 0.32 -0.11 0.88 0.225 
- Dutch in the Netherlands  
 
Surinamese in Suriname   0.406 0.37 -0.33 1.68 0.427 
- Dutch in the Netherlands 
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Table 3: Table 1: mean scores (with number of respondents in parentheses) for 
values concerning counterfeit products relative to original products (Table A2) 
 
 
 
    Surinamese  Surinamese  Dutch (200) 
Values   in Suriname  in the Netherlands in the Netherlands 
     
 
C1   5.00 (218)  4.51 (108)  4.15  
C2   4.98 (214)  5.66 (109)  5.22 
C3   4.27 (215)  3.96 (108)  3.66 
C4   3.59 (216)  3.28 (108)  3.34 
C5   4.12 (216)  3.75 (108)  5.02 
C6   5.81 (215)  5.14 (109)  3.85  
C7   4.21 (216)  4.15 (106)  4.29 
C8   4.80 (216)  4.82 (107)  4.33 
C9   4.07 (217)  3.94 (109)  3.70 
C10   5.01 (215)  4.98 (109)  4.65 
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Table 4: Differences in values concerning counterfeit products relative to 
original products (Table A2) 
 
 
People versus people    Mean Median Min. Max. SD 
 
 
Surinamese in Suriname   0.167 0.22 -0.68 0.67 0.369 
- Surinamese in the Netherlands 
 
Surinamese in the Netherlands   0.198 0.32 -1.27 1.29 0.644 
- Dutch in the Netherlands  
 
Surinamese in Suriname   0.365 0.365 -0.90 1.96 0.747 
- Dutch in the Netherlands 
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Table 5: mean scores (with number of respondents in parentheses) for values 
concerning production and sales of counterfeit products (Table A3) 
 
 
 
 
    Surinamese  Surinamese  Dutch (200) 
Values   in Suriname  in the Netherlands in the Netherlands 
 
 
P1   4.29 (214)  4.81 (109)  3.75 
P2   4.55 (212)  4.32 (109)  4.56  
P3   4.75 (213)  4.74 (109)  3.87 
P4   3.45 (213)  3.48 (108)  4.18 
P5   3.71 (208)  4.02 (109)  3.88 
P6   4.39 (210)  4.44 (109)  3.84 
P7   4.91 (215)  5.24 (107)  4.14 
P8   3.24 (214)  4.07 (108)  5.01  
P9   4.80 (212)  4.33 (108)  3.87 
P10   5.08 (213)  4.77 (106)  4.32 
P11   5.62 (212)  4.04 (107)  4.11 
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Table 6: Differences in values concerning the production and sales of counterfeit 
products (Table A3) 
 
 
People versus people    Mean Median Min. Max. SD 
 
 
Surinamese in Suriname   0.048 -0.03 -0.83 1.58 0.633 
- Surinamese in the Netherlands 
 
Surinamese in the Netherlands   0.248 0.45 -0.94 1.10 0.681 
- Dutch in the Netherlands  
 
Surinamese in Suriname   0.296 0.55 -1.77 1.51 0.917 
- Dutch in the Netherlands 
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Table 7: Demographics of respondents (A = Surinamese in Suriname, B = 
Surinamese in the Netherlands, and C = Dutch in the Netherlands (200 
respondents) (with numbers of respondents in parentheses) 
 
 
Variable Statistic   A  B  C 
 
Age  Mean    28.5 (211) 46.4 (109) 42.0 
  Median   24  48  41 
  Minimum   18  17  18 
  Maximum   79  103  78 
  Standard deviation  11.5  16.4  14.9 
 
Gender Fraction males   37.7% (215) 38.5% (109) 54.0% 
   
 
Ethnic   Creole    33.3%  60.0%  NA  
Group  Hindu    13.3%  7.5%  NA 
  Mixed    28.0%  15.8%  NA 
   
 
Adults in Mean    2.8 (209) 1.6 (106) 1.7 
Household Median   3  2  2 
  Minimum   0  0  0 
  Maximum   9  5  4  
  Standard deviation  1.5  0.89  0.79 
 
Children in Mean    1.4 (190) 0.57 (99) 0.59 
Household Median   1  0  0 
  Minimum   0  0  0 
  Maximum   8  3  3 
  Standard deviation  1.4  0.87  0.86 
 
 
Working  Mean    2.4 (210) 1.4 (106) 1.4 
Adults in  Median   2  1  1 
Household Minimum   0  0  0 
  Maximum   7  5  4 
  Standard deviation  1.1  1.0  1.0 
 
 
 
 27
Table 8: Did you ever consciously purchase a counterfeit product? 
 
 
 
Surinamese in Suriname     83.7% 
  
Surinamese in the Netherlands     77.4% 
    
Dutch in the Netherlands     50.0% 
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Table 9: P-values in probit models for purchase of counterfeit products (yes = 1, 
no = 0) (A = Surinamese in Suriname, B = Surinamese in the Netherlands, and C 
= Dutch in the Netherlands) 
 
 
 
 
 
Significance of variables    P value 
 
      
      A  B  C 
 
All      0.333  0.362  0.373  
 
Income, income^2    0.281  0.235  0.322 
 
Creole, Hindu (Mixed)   0.498  0.420   
 
Years in the Netherlands, years ^2    0.974 
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Table 10: Income distribution (A = Surinamese in Suriname, B = Surinamese in 
the Netherlands, and C = Dutch in the Netherlands) 
 
   Income categories   Fraction 
 
A   < 800 SRD    55.3 % 
   800 – 1200 SRD   17.5 % 
   1200 – 2000 SRD   17.0 % 
   2000 – 2800 SRD   4.4 % 
   2800 – 4000 SRD   2.4 % 
   > 4000 SRD    3.4 % 
 
   Average (Approx.)   1000 SRD ≈ 225 Euro 
 
 
B   < 400 Euro    0.0 % 
   400 – 800 Euro   6.5 % 
   800 – 1600 Euro   15.0 % 
   1600 – 3200 Euro   43.0 % 
   3200 – 4000 Euro   17.8 % 
   > 4000 Euro    17.8 % 
 
   Average (Approx.)   2750 Euro 
 
 
C   < 400 Euro    13.5 % 
   400 – 800 Euro   10.0 % 
   800 – 1600 Euro   27.0 % 
   1600 – 3200 Euro   26.5 % 
   3200 – 4000 Euro   3.5 % 
   > 4000 Euro    2.0 % 
   Do not tell    17.5% 
 
   Average (Approx.)   1543 Euro 
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Figure 1: Per capita income in Suriname (SUR) and the Netherlands (NLD) in 
USD (Source: World Bank) for 1975-2008 and 1960-2008, respectively 
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Figure 2: Ratio of GDP in USD of the Netherlands over Suriname 
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Table 11: Scores on questions “Considering the price of the products, would you 
consider purchasing counterfeits?” Fully disagree is 1 and fully agree is 7. The 
cells are the percentage disagree DAG)(scores 1, 2, and 3), and the percentage 
agree AG (scores 5, 6 and 7) (A = Surinamese in Suriname, B = Surinamese in 
the Netherlands, and C = Dutch in the Netherlands) 
 
 
Product  A   B   C 
 
   DAG AG  DAG AG  DAG AG 
 
Digital camera  74.76 10.95  77.57 10.28  62.50 13.00 
Mobile phone  74.29 10.95  72.48 14.68  63.00 13.50 
Clothing  31.78 39.25  33.94 43.12  29.00 37.00 
Music CD  25.35 48.36  25.00 43.52  38.50 31.00 
DVD movies  24.17 51.66  23.36 47.66  40.00 30.00 
Shoes   51.66 23.22  52.78 25.00  44.50 26.00 
Perfumes  68.42 12.44  62.96 21.30  47.50 24.00 
Watches  57.21 16.35  50.94 24.53  42.50 24.50 
Car parts  63.94 15.87  55.66 24.53  45.50 23.00 
Jewellery  59.24 10.18  56.48 20.37  40.00 20.00 
TV sets  72.60 12.98  74.07 11.11  59.50 10.50 
Electric kitchen tools 72.95 22.56  64.81 11.96  49.00 19.00 
Radios   67.31 13.46  63.89 15.74  46.00 16.50 
Ironers   66.83 12.20  57.80 15.60  48.00 18.00 
Books   23.56 43.75  44.44 36.11  41.00 23.00 
Body care products 66.35 15.87  64.49 20.56  42.50 25.00 
Medicine (oral intake) 78.26 11.11  71.03 14.95  63.00 11.50 
Medicine (other) 78.37 11.54  64.81 20.37  54.50 16.50 
Food and beverage 70.05 14.01  57.01 27.16  40.50 22.50 
Home appliances 37.98 29.33  40.74 31.48  31.50 30.00 
 
 
Average  58.25 21.31  55.71 24.00  46.43 21.73  
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Table 12: Differences in preferences for purchasing counterfeit products 
 (Table 11) 
 
 
People versus people    Mean Median Min. Max. SD 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
Surinamese in Suriname   2.54 2.31 -20.88 13.56 7.43 
- Surinamese in the Netherlands 
 
Surinamese in the Netherlands   9.29 9.98 -16.64 21.99 9.55 
- Dutch in the Netherlands  
 
Surinamese in Suriname   11.83 14.99 -17.44 29.55 13.52  
- Dutch in the Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
Surinamese in Suriname   -2.69 -3.57 -13.15 10.60 6.21 
- Surinamese in the Netherlands 
 
Surinamese in the Netherlands   2.28 0.90 -7.04 17.66 6.16  
- Dutch in the Netherlands  
 
Surinamese in Suriname   -0.41 -2.61 -11.56 21.66 9.76 
- Dutch in the Netherlands 
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Table 13: Correlations across preferences for purchasing counterfeit products 
(Table 11) (A = Surinamese in Suriname, B = Surinamese in the Netherlands, 
and C = Dutch in the Netherlands) 
 
 
      A  B  C 
 
Disagree   A  1.00  0.93  0.74 
    B    1.00  0.81 
    C      1.00 
 
 
      A  B  C 
 
Agree    A  1.00  0.89  0.73  
    B    1.00  0.87 
    C      1.00 
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